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Singular thought, mental reference, reference determination, co-
reference, informative identities, propositional attitudes, attitude 
ascriptions, de se thought, indexical thought, perceptual concepts, 
identification, recognition and misrecognition. These notions and 
phenomena, so central to philosophical inquiry in mind and lan-
guage, have been often articulated and explained by deploying the 
increasingly popular idea of a mental file. A mental file is a structure 
for the storage of information that a subject takes to be, internally, 
about one and the same external object. Its notion is deeply rooted in 
our folk psychology and it is akin to the idea of a concept, a cognitive 
particular or a mental representation standing for an individual ob-
ject. A mental file is a philosopher’s construct originally introduced 
by Grice (1969: 141-2) under the label ‘dossier’ in his discussion of 
vacuous names and referentially used descriptions. Strawson (1974: 
54-6) uses a similar idea in his discussion of identity statements. Ev-
ans (1973: 199, ff.) talks of a speaker’s ‘body of information associ-
ated with a name’ within his information-based account of reference 
determination and borrows Grice’s notion of a dossier of information 
within his (1982: Chapter 8, spec. 276-7) account of recognition-
based identification. Perry (1980) introduces the label ‘mental file’ 
for the first time to account for the phenomenon of continued be-
lief. He (2001: 128-46) appeals to the same notion to account for 
the phenomenon of co-reference and in his (2002) introduces the 
Self file to provide the sense of the indexical ‘I’. Bach (1987: Chap-
ter 3, spec. 34-9, 44) deploys mental files in his discussion of de re 
thought. Devitt (1989: 227-8, 231) does it in his account of informa-
tive identity statements. Forbes (1989; 1990: 538-45) uses the no-
tion of a dossier associated to a name to specify the content of belief 
ascriptions. Jeshion (2010: 129, ff.) presents a new theory of singular 
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thought as thought from mental files. Friend (2011: spec. 194, 198, 
200; forthcoming) appeals to mental files to explain the phenome-
non of intersubjective identification of fictional characters within an 
ontologically irrealist framework. More authors have deployed the 
same metaphor more often than one might initially think.
It is remarkable, however, that while philosophers of mind and 
language have been very keen on deploying mental files they have 
never engaged in a serious investigation of their nature. This is until 
Oxford University Press published two books in 2012 that will estab-
lish the agenda for future research in this area. The first is François 
Recanati’s Mental Files, which offers a rich and sophisticated theory of 
singular reference in language and thought focusing on mental files 
as the constituents of individual thinking. The second is Mark Sains-
bury’s and Michael Tye’s Seven Puzzles of Thought. And How to Solve 
Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts, which is an elegant, simple and 
quite natural theory of public and intersubjective concepts (one with 
which I am very sympathetic). There are three aspects of Recanati’s 
theory that make it the perfect subject for a book symposium though. 
First, it is innovative in that it puts forward an original Neo-Fregean 
theory of singular reference in terms of mental files. Second, it is 
partially controversial, as it will become clear by reading the criti-
cal articles of this symposium. And third, as a consequence, it is in 
urgent need of clarification, which has been provided here by the 
author.
Recanati is one of the leading figures in contemporary philoso-
phy of language. His contributions span from the theory of meaning, 
semantic content and truth conditions to the theory of pragmatic 
processes, from direct reference, empty singular terms and definite 
descriptions to speech act theory, from the theory of perspectival 
thought, relativism and contextualism to indirect discourse and quo-
tation. The topic of his new book falls squarely within the philosophy 
of mind. But Recanati explicitly introduces his theory as a sequel to 
the one he elaborated in his Direct Reference. From Language to Thought, 
thus contributing to both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy 
of language. According to him, a mental file is like a singular term in 
the language of thought. It is a cognitive structure for the storage of 
information (or misinformation) that a subject takes to be about an 
external object. More specifically, it is a mode of presentation — a 
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Fregean Sinn — associated to a linguistic singular term and it is non-
descriptive because its reference is determined relationally rather 
than satisfactionally. Modes of presentation determine the referent 
of the singular term to which they are associated, they account for 
its cognitive significance and for the clustering of information about 
the referent of the term. Furthermore, Recanati suggests that mental 
files (types) are individuated not through the information they con-
tain, but through the type of epistemically rewarding relations that 
originate them. An epistemically rewarding relation is a relation of 
acquaintance (either past, present or, possibly, future) that a subject 
entertains with a certain object in a certain context and that allows 
to gain information from the object.
The book is divided into nine parts. In the first part Recanati 
argues against several varieties of Descriptivism and in favor of the 
mental file approach as an original Neo-Fregean version of Singular-
ism — the view according to which we can think about individual 
objects directly (through some relation of acquaintance) or indirectly 
(via knowledge of some properties and relations that they might ex-
emplify). The second part is dedicated to the introduction of the 
notion of mental files as non-descriptive modes of presentation and 
to the articulation of an account of identity judgments in terms of 
Perry’s notion of linking as an operation on distinct files. Further 
discussion is dedicated to presumptions of identity, which are ex-
plained in terms of operations within a single file. The third part 
is dedicated to the full articulation of Recanati’s original model of 
mental files as mental indexicals, i.e. cognitive particulars whose 
reference is determined through a contextually relevant relation of 
acquaintance and existing only as long as that relation holds. Further 
attention is dedicated to the introduction of more stable files with 
a longer life span such as the Self file based on the identity relation 
to oneself, the recognitional files based on a familiarity relation and 
the encyclopaedic files based on a purpose-tracking relation. In the 
fourth part Recanati introduces the notion of co-reference de jure 
— defined as a relation between two singular terms to the effect 
that anybody who understands a piece of discourse involving the two 
terms thereby knows that they co-refer — and he addresses several 
versions of different traditional objections. The fifth part consists 
in a critical discussion of the controversial aspects of de jure co-ref-
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erence regarding factivity and epistemic transparency. In the sixth 
part Recanati claims that the traditional acquaintance constraint on 
singular thought should be theorized as a normative claim rather 
than as a factual claim, and this would allow him to countenance 
acquaintanceless singular thoughts. The seventh part focuses on at-
titude ascriptions and the meta-representational function of mental 
files as representations of how other speakers think about objects in 
the world. In the eighth part Recanati elaborates on the communica-
tion of singular thought and in particular on de se thoughts, indexical 
thoughts and cases of referentially used descriptions. The ninth part 
is dedicated to the articulation of the advantages of the mental files 
framework against its main competitors, including Perry’s token re-
flexive account and Lewis’s centered world framework.
The symposium includes seven critical discussions and Recanati’s 
replies. In the first contribution Annalisa Coliva and Delia Belleri 
lead an organic discussion of what they see as some obscurities con-
cerning the nature of mental files, the acquaintance constraint on 
singular thought and the origination of a file with no actual acquain-
tance to its referent, the notion of epistemic transparency and that 
of de se thought.
In the second contribution Keith Hall focuses on the nature and 
coherence of Recanati’s acquaintance constraint on singular thought 
interpreted as a normative claim rather than a factual claim. Hall 
criticizes Recanati’s replies to upholders of the idea that we have ac-
quaintanceless singular thought and discusses the consequences of 
a loophole he individuates in Recanati’s thesis according to which 
we can entertain a singular thought about an object with which we 
are not yet acquainted by introducing a descriptive name into public 
language.
In the third contribution Peter Pagin articulates a critical discus-
sion of the connection between semantics and cognitive significance 
and individuates a few problems with Recanati’s account. He recom-
mends that we should distinguish between a linguistic expression 
and its semantic properties and criticizes Recanati’s idea according 
to which mental files correspond both to the linguistic expression 
and to the cognitive significance of that expression.
In the fourth contribution Krista Lawlor critically assesses two 
objections that Recanati makes against Descriptivism, concerning 
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the communication of singular thought and the internalization of ac-
quaintance relations promoted by certain sophisticated versions such 
as token reflexive accounts. She expresses the doubt that Recanati’s 
own theory might fall pray to his own criticisms of the alternative 
descriptivist views.
In the fifth contribution David Papineau focuses on Recanati’s in-
dexical model of mental files and defends two theses. The first is that 
there is less indexicality in the mind than there is in language. The 
second is that mental files are more like names than like indexicals.
In the sixth contribution Thea Goodsell criticizes the way in 
which Recanati individuates mental files as typed by epistemically 
rewarding relations.
In the seventh and last critical contribution Manuel García-Car-
pintero surveys Perry’s and Lewis’s contrasting proposals about the 
interpretation of de se thoughts, Stalnaker’s argument for an original 
version of the latter view and Recanati’s take on it in Mental Files. He 
further argues that Recanati’s (2007, 2009) Lewisian account of de 
se contents is in tension with the mental files approach to content-
ingredients he has been developing in his work, including its full ar-
ticulation in Mental Files.
The latter contribution to this symposium consists of Recanati’s 
replies to his critics. In this occasion Recanati not only clarifies and 
better articulates many of the ideas he presented in the book, but 
further develops new and more radical hypotheses about the correct 
interpretation of the acquaintance constraint on singular thought, 
about the notion of singular reference and singular thought involved 
in discourse about fictional characters and in the use of descriptive 
names, about the indexical model of files and more.
I would like to thank the authors who accepted my invitation and 
elaborated their criticisms in a genuinely deep and rigorous way. And 
I would like to thank Recanati who immediately expressed his genu-
ine enthusiasm for this symposium and who contributed a long piece 
containing some important clarification on his present proposal and 
on its possible future developments.
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